One region, three availability zones or a global edge do not help when they share the mechanism that failed.
AWS: one empty DNS record, many broken services
On 19–20 October 2025, a latent race condition in DynamoDB DNS automation produced an empty US-EAST-1 endpoint record. AWS recorded impact across EC2 launches, Lambda, ECS, EKS, Fargate, Connect, Redshift, authentication and support access over different periods of an event lasting roughly 15 hours.
The boundary
This was not a global disappearance of AWS. Existing EC2 instances remained healthy and some cross-region configurations continued to work.
Azure: the global front door closed
On 29 October 2025, incompatible configuration metadata crashed Azure Front Door edge sites. For more than eight hours, customers saw timeouts and DNS failures affecting Azure and Microsoft services across regions.
The boundary
Some dependent services failed over successfully. Microsoft also said some services had no established fallback strategy.
Cloudflare: four failures, four mechanisms
Between June 2025 and February 2026, Cloudflare documented a third-party storage dependency failure, two global-change incidents and an accidental withdrawal of customer BYOIP routes.
- 12 June 2025: Workers KV dependency cascade
- 18 November 2025: oversized Bot Management feature file
- 5 December 2025: 28% of served HTTP traffic affected
- 20 February 2026: BYOIP prefixes withdrawn
Open the Cloudflare incident dossier →